The purpose of this paper is to explore the question of whether a free floating exchange rate regime is a viable option for Korea. This paper divides the sample period into three subperiods: pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis. We then analyze the causal relationships among both levels and volatility of three financial variables: exchange rates, interest rates, and stock prices. By using Granger causality tests and variance decomposition, our empirical results show that causal relations among the three variables are weak during the post-crisis period, and furthermore, shocks in other financial markets do not have a significant contribution to explain the variations of each variable's forecast errors. Based on these empirical findings, we infer that the Korean government, having adopted the de jure freely floating exchange rate regime, is still fearful of floating for various reasons.
INTRODUCTION
The type of exchange rate regime in emerging economies has been at the center of economic debate since the Asian currency crisis. The choice of exchange rate regime has been regarded as critical for emerging economies to achieve sustainable economic growth and also has important implications for the world economy. In principle, the most appropriate regime for any given economy may differ, depending on the particular economic circumstances, such as the degree of integration into the world economy. Since economic circumstances vary over time, the most appropriate regime for any given country may also change over time. 2 As a lesson from the recent crises, one widely shared conclusion is that soft-peg exchange rate regimes are extremely vulnerable and inherently crisis-prone in a world of volatile capital movements. Consequently, a number of relatively fixed rate countries in East Asia were encouraged, in their interest and for the broader interests of the international community, to adopt floating rate regimes. Jadresic et al. (1999) highlight the example by pointing out that Chile, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, and Turkey all seem to have benefited from the flexibility of their exchange rates during the recent international crisis. An underlying notion of this argument is that a more flexible exchange rate regime leads to an awareness of both investors and borrowers about risk exposures related to exchange rate fluctuations, while a pegged exchange rate regime offers an implicit guarantee to creditors that leads to moral hazard and financial vulnerability.
Countries who chose a currency board arrangement, such as Hong Kong and Argentina, were also relatively less affected by the crisis, encouraging opinions in favor of currency boards to be heard more loudly (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999) . This locked-in exchange rate commitment to major anchor currencies, mostly the U.S. dollar, means abolishing the central bank and its discretionary monetary policies. It means also making those steps difficult to reverse. Accordingly, when choosing an exchange regime, more emphasis tends to be placed on either flexibility or credibility. As long as developing countries maintain open capital accounts, two such options are considered suitable in light of the impossible trinity hypothesis. 3 Nevertheless, questions related to two-corner solutions on whether such extreme exchange rate regimes are adequate for developing countries have risen. The biggest problem of a free-floating exchange rate regime is how to cope with the short-term volatility of exchange rates and the possibility of intermediate and long-term misalignments. These concerns may lead to the question of to what extent intervention under the free-floating exchange rate regime should be permitted. It is not easy to explain why countries having adopted de jure free-floating exchange rate regimes also attempt to reduce exchange rate fluctuations through intervention. Calvo and Reinhart (2000a) call this "fear of floating" in explaining why exchange rate rigidity is conspicuous in the case of developing countries.
Developing countries are sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations because the cost of exchange rate volatility is greater than the benefit when compared to developed countries. Developing countries with large external liabilities (denominated in foreign currencies) are required to watch for the drastic exchange rate depreciation (or devaluation) that may increase the debt burden on financial institutions and heighten the likelihood of a currency and financial crisis. If the financial sector's vulnerability deepens due to drastic exchange rate depreciation, the sovereign credit rating of the developing country would deteriorate; limited access to the international financial market could lead to a situation of sudden stop (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000b) . 4 In addition, exchange rate fluctuations may have a substantial impact on the prices in developing countries. Abrupt exchange rate depreciation with low credibility of monetary policy may lead to heightened inflationary pressures on the domestic prices through exchange rate passthrough. To cope with inflationary pressure, the monetary authorities may raise the domestic interest rate as is evident in the high variability of interest rates in developing countries. Although interest rate hikes would contribute to mitigating inflationary pressures and defend the currency as well, negative side effects on the real and financial sector would also be envisaged. Fear of inflation accompanied by fear of floating would be another toll on the economy in developing countries (Goldfajn and Olivares, 2000) . Accordingly, the fact that developing countries need to adopt policies that reduce short-term exchange rate volatility and eliminate intermediate and long-term misalignments brings forward the question whether two-corner solutions are indeed the appropriate exchange regime.
Against this backdrop, assertions that flexible but managed floating exchange rate regimes can prove beneficial in practice have been put forward. Although there is some truth in the allegation that intermediate regimes are vulnerable to speculative attacks, they still offer offsetting advantages (Williamson, 2000) . Williamson (1998) proposes monitoring bands to supplement previous proposals for crawling bands. This calls for giving up the responsibility to maintain the exchange rate band to a certain extent without intervention within the bands to form tacit expectations for the bands in the market.
The purpose of this paper is to delve into the question of whether a free floating exchange rate regime is a viable option for Korea. The recent experiences in Korea will provide not a definitive, but an insightful answer to this question. Although we cannot directly check whether the Korean government intervened or not, we try to find indirect evidence that the government continued to intervene in the foreign exchange market even after it officially adopted the free-floating exchange rate regime. This paper divides the sample period into three subperiods: pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis. Then we analyze the causal relationships among both levels and volatility of three financial variables: exchange rates, interest rates, and stock prices. The empirical results will provide clues for understanding how the Korean financial markets have evolved after the crisis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section will review the stylized facts related to the movements of the three financial variables. Section 3 will conduct empirical analyses to discover the relationships among these three variables. Finally, based upon the empirical results, we will discuss the policy implications and the relevance of the exchange rate regime in Korea.
STYLIZED FACTS ON EXCHANGE RATES AND RELATED FINANCIAL VARIABLES
In this section, we will describe the stylized facts on exchange rates movements and their relationship with related financial variables such as interest rates and stock prices. In order to find out whether regime changes induce structural breaks in the behaviors among three variables (exchange rates, interest rates, and stock prices), we divide the overall period into pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis.
The market average exchange rate (MAR) system, as a variant of a managed floating exchange rate regime, was adopted in March 1990. Since then, the won-dollar exchange rates have been in principle determined by market forces. However, frequent interventions by the Bank of Korea were also common phenomena. The actual change in the exchange rate regime took place in December 1997, when the Korean government abolished the previous managed floating regime. However, in October 1997, there were episodes of speculative attacks on the Hong Kong dollar as well as the Hong Kong stock market crash, and the spread of forward contracts rose rapidly in the offshore nondeliverable forward (NDF) markets. Taking these developments into account, we presume that the crisis period started in October 1997. Finally, we suppose that the post-crisis started in September 1998, because the first-round of financial restructuring was completed at that time and the domestic spot rates and the offshore NDF three-month forward rates have moved more tightly since that time. Accordingly, the three subperiods are defined as follows 5 : -Pre-crisis period: March 2, 1990 -September 30, 1997 -Crisis period: October 1, 1997 -September 30, 1998 -Post-crisis period: October 1, 1998 -September 30, 1999 2.1. Pre-Crisis Period: March 1990 -September 1997 During the pre-crisis period, Korea maintained the MAR system which could be classified as a managed floating exchange rate system. Under this system, the Bank of Korea occasionally intervened in the foreign exchange market, although the modes and frequency of intervention changed, as did the objectives guiding the intervention. Active intervention resulted in changes in foreign reserves, whatever sterilization or nonsterilization took place. However, indirect intervention, through changes in monetary policies, did not result in changes in foreign reserves.
Despite continued extensive capital controls, liberalization measures during the pre-crisis period led to increasingly larger net capital inflows. In addition, an investment-led boom between 1994 and 1996 generated a strong demand for low cost capital. This steep increase in net capital inflows put appreciation pressures on the Korean won. To offset these pressures, the government relied on restrained sterilization and managed to curb the abrupt appreciation of the won and the resultant increase in the current account deficit. During early 1994 to mid-1995, exchange rates mildly appreciated, interest rates rose, and stock prices continued to rise. Furthermore, Standard and Poor's upgrading of Korea's sovereign credit rating in May 1995 attracted further foreign portfolio investment. However, the current account balance sharply deteriorated from mid-1995, resulting in the depreciation of the Korean won by offsetting the downward pressures of the capital account surplus. The combination of foreign capital inflows and expansionary monetary policies caused the interest rates to fall. However, stock prices started to fall in early 1995. The Korean economy experienced large negative terms of trade shock in the second quarter of 1996, which created a significant depreciation pressure on the Korean won. As a result, the current account deficit in 1996 reached a historical high-US$ 23.7 billion.
Although a lion's share of foreign capital inflow also rushed in through bank loans, mainly due to interest differentials between domestic and foreign capital markets, capital inflows through portfolio investment funds significantly affected exchange rate fluctuations. Furthermore, as foreign investors became increasingly important market players in the Korean stock market, the Korean stock price index (KOSPI) was also influenced by foreigners' equity investment flows to a substantial extent. Therefore, it might be expected that there existed a negative correlation between stock prices and won-dollar exchange rates. Nevertheless, although there were continuous inflows of foreign investors' equity investment during 1992-1994, no noticeable relationship between these two variables could be captured. Since the KOSPI hit its highest level (1,138.75) on November 8, 1994, it had already started its slide even before the crisis broke out. Note. The real effective exchange rates are calculated based on trade-weight, consumer prices index, and January 1993 as the base year.
In conclusion, large interest rate differentials and the overhauling of the previous heavy regulations on capital movements were major contributing factors in triggering massive capital inflows. Although these massive capital inflows, including foreign stock purchases, offset the depreciation pressure induced by the current account deficit, the Korean won dropped to 753 won per dollar on July 7, 1995, 6 and continued to depreciate gradually until the crisis set in. Since all the regional currencies, except China's renminbi and the Hong Kong dollar, lost value after the crisis, many economists and policymakers argued that these regional currencies were overvalued on the eve of the crisis. Although the lack of an operational definition of overvaluation is still troubling, 7 the price-based real effective exchange rates in Korea had been around the equilibrium level until 1994, but were slightly overvalued on the eve of the 1997 currency crisis according to our calculations shown in Table I . 8
Crisis Period: October 1997-September 1998
The currency crisis led to a dramatic depreciation of the nominal exchange rates. The sudden collapse of investors' confidence and concomitant capital outflows, and/or the sharp decline of the rollover ratio of short-term external borrowings, caused the nominal exchange rates to overshoot during the crisis. Inflation, albeit higher than before the crisis, had been below expectations; consequently, real exchange rates depreciated by about 20%. Most observers agree that exchange rates fell below the levels required to achieve adequate current account adjustment. There are two mechanisms through which the real exchange rate can be corrected in case it is undervalued: through nominal currency appreciation or through higher inflation. As in Goldfajn and Gupta (1999) , we can say that a successful reversal occurs primarily through nominal appreciation rather than through higher inflation. 6 The won-dollar exchange rate bottomed out at the level of 695.5 on March 5, 1989 as a result of continued current account surpluses in the late 1980s.
7 On the definition of overvaluation, see Chinn (1998), Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996) , and Williamson (1994) .
8 Radelet and Sachs (1998) reported that the real effective exchange rate appreciated by about 12% in Korea between 1990 and early 1997. Chinn (1998) , interestingly, reported that the Korean won was undervalued even before its recent discrete drop in value.
Due to large increases in nominal interest rates under the IMF program, Korea stands out as having maintained real interest rates at a significantly higher level than before the crisis for an uninterrupted period of several months. 9 Therefore, it has experienced sharp slowdowns in money and credit growth during the adjustment process thus far. 10 Realizing the hardships faced by the real economic sector, however, the IMF took a more flexible stance toward the high interest rate policy in the 5th Letter of Intent (February 7, 1998) . Accordingly, the government ought to be pushing forward with its plan to lower interest rates as it gains momentum in stabilizing the foreign exchange market. The Korean government brought down the short-term interest rates from a 30% level in January 1998 to a 15% level in June 1998, as the won-dollar exchange rate demonstrated considerable stability staying between 1300 and 1400 since March 1998. As an ensuing effect, the call rate initially fell to a 27% level in early 1998 and further fell to 15% by late June of 1998. Furthermore, corporate bond yields with a 3-year maturity fell to 14% on July 4, 1998.
Stock prices had already declined during the pre-crisis period. This indicated one of the earliest signs of trouble, although policymakers were inclined to believe that declining stock prices were mainly due to cyclical factors rather than structural problems. During 1996, stock prices (in domestic currency terms) fell by more than 20% in Korea. Several of the largest chaebol posted losses in 1996 and 6 of the top 30 went bankrupt in 1997 before the crisis broke out. The crisis aggravated the situation and severely undermined investors' confidence in the stock market. As a result, the stock price index fell to 376.31 by the end of December 1997.
Having hit the bottom, the KOSPI quickly recovered at the beginning of 1998, with the aid of foreigners' stock purchases. However, after peaking at 574.35 on March 2, 1998, the KOSPI once again began to slide downward. Following the sudden weakening of the Japanese yen, the KOSPI plunged below 300 on June 16. 11 Again, foreign investors left the Korean market, and more bankruptcies were predicted while corporate and financial restructuring was in process. During the crisis period, foreign portfolio investors had played an increasingly important role in determining stock prices.
Stock prices and exchange rates also moved in a predictable direction during the early crisis period (October 1997 -December 1997 . As the crisis set in, exchange rates sharply depreciated and stock prices plunged. However, the stock prices fell again in February 1998 and remained stagnant until the end of September while the won-dollar exchange rate stabilized (appreciated) remarkably. In conclusion, foreign portfolio investment did not contribute to the stability of foreign exchange rates in Korea during the latter period of the crisis.
Post-Crisis Period: October 1998-September 1999
One of the most commonly voiced objections to the floating exchange rate regime is that exchange rates will be excessively volatile. During the crisis period, exchange rates and asset prices were highly volatile. Starting in September 1998, however, the Korean won began to exhibit an impressive degree of stability. As was the case in the Mexican experience during 1996-97, we may ask ourselves whether this stability was consistent with the freely floating regime. A particularly interesting aspect of the Mexican case is that the relative lack of volatility of the peso-dollar rate during this period was not caused by direct central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market. According to Edwards and Savastano (1998) , however, during this period the central bank adopted a feedback rule for monetary policy that took into consideration the short-run behavior of the nominal exchange rate. 12 During the post-crisis period, starting from October 1998, we clearly observe simultaneous interactions between interest rates and exchange rates. Both interest rates and won-dollar exchange rates continued to fall. Furthermore, since most foreign portfolio investment took place in the stock market rather than the bond market, the continued inflow of foreign portfolio investment funds not only boosted the stock prices, but also contributed to the stability of exchange rates.
One of the most impressive developments during the post-crisis period is the continued increase of Korea's usable foreign reserves. The usable foreign reserves increased from less than US$ 3.9 billion in December 1997 to US$ 48.5 billion in December 1998 and to US$ 66.2 billion in October 1999. Such a level of foreign reserves would serve as an effective buffer against any potential external shock. However, the accumulation of the foreign reserves also contributed to easing of appreciation pressures induced by the current account surplus and the continued capital inflow through foreign direct and portfolio investment funds.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate empirical relations among three financial variables -exchange rates, stock prices, and interest rates-to see if there has been any active foreign exchange market intervention after the crisis, that is to say, to infer from the empirical results if there has been any change in policy directions toward the foreign exchange market since the free-floating regime was adopted as a market discipline.
Because the intervention data are, unfortunately, not available to the public in Korea, we cannot identify how the operations of the government's intervention have changed after the crisis. Thus, in order to determine if exchange rate fluctuations under the free-floating regime have still remained under the reign of government authority, as it had been under the managed floating scheme, we only have empirical findings to resort to.
There are numerous economic rationales to connect those three financial variables. For example, according to the hypothesis of interest parity, expected changes in the nominal exchange rate should be positively related to the difference in the nominal interest rates across countries. However, the empirical evidence for this hypothesis is mixed and inconclusive (Dornbush, 1976; Bilson, 1979) . Also, there are several papers which find support for the conclusion that interest rates are an important factor for determining equity returns (Breen et al. 1989) . Here, we do not test those unsettled theoretical and empirical issues regarding the relationship, such as interest parity or joint dynamics of the equity and bond markets. Rather, our interest lies in finding out if price variables in the foreign exchange, stock, and bond markets are likely to have different empirical relations before and after the crisis in terms of level and volatility.
Since bond markets in Korea are not well developed in the sense of not having deep and liquid secondary markets of benchmark yields, we pay close attention to the relationship between stock prices and exchange rates before and after the crisis. Our testing hypothesis is that there should be close empirical relationships in either level or volatility between the KOSPI index and exchange rates if there has been no foreign exchange market intervention. This intuition stems from two facts. First, the KOSPI index moves closely with foreign investors' net purchase as shown in Fig. 1 . Even though the daily stock trading volume by foreign investors is less than 10% in value, they are major driving forces for the movements of the level and volatility of the index. Second, it is reasonable to think that capital inflows, mainly due to foreign portfolio investment, are also playing a major role in the foreign exchange market since the daily average turnover of the foreign exchange market is only US$ 2∼3 billion.
FIG. 1. Net foreign equity purchase and stock prices (KOSPI).
These intuitions provide the following mixture model that describes the relationship between the stock price index and the exchange rate (Tauchen and Pitts, 1983) :
where P 1t , P 2t denote the stock price index and exchange rate, respectively, u 1t , u 2t are independent N (0, 1) variables, µ 1t , µ 2t are predictable parts, and I t represents the random number of news commonly arriving at both markets. It can be easily seen that both markets are driven in either level or volatility by common variables of a news arrival process such as foreign investors' net purchase of stock. If the government actively intervenes after adopting a free-floating exchange rate system, it is very difficult to find any empirical relation between the two variables.
There are many ways to analyze interrelationships among the three financial variables. One simple, but useful empirical methodology to uncover and compare interrelationships among the three variables is Granger causality tests and variance decomposition that are byproducts of vector auto regression (VAR) estimation. Granger causality tests provide information about causal or explanatory relations between two variables. The forecast error variance decomposition tells us the proportion of the movement in a sequence due to its own shocks versus shocks to the other variables and, therefore, a sequence can be exogenous or endogenous. When we perform our empirical analysis, we undertake a separate analysis of the crisis period since the free-floating period covers an abnormal situation which was extremely volatile in the latter part of 1997.
Data
We used as samples 2242 daily data on three financial variables which cover the period of March 2, 1990 to September 30, 1999. The crisis and post-crisis period have almost the same sample size (240 and 241, respectively), while the pre-crisis period, covering the duration of the managed floating regime, has a much larger sample (1761). The won-dollar exchange rates as the daily closed values, interest rates as three-year corporate bond yields, and stock prices as the daily closed values of the KOSPI were used. The levels and differences of the three variables are depicted in Figs. 2-4 .
Basic statistics on the three variables are reported in Table II . None of the three variables show any large deviation from a normal distribution in terms of skewness. 13 Surprisingly, however, most of the kurtosis shows thin tails when compared to a normal distribution, which has not been the case in previous empirical findings of advanced countries. The standard deviation of stock prices during the crisis period has the lowest number since the stock prices plunged sharply during 13 The standard normal distribution has a value of 0 and 3 in skewness and kurtosis, respectively. the early stages of the crisis and remained at low levels for quite a while. In contrast, the won-dollar exchange rates show a degree of high volatility during the crisis by having a value of standard deviation roughly four times higher than during the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. Interestingly, however, standard deviations between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods do not show any difference. This might imply that the foreign exchange market, under the free-floating regime, performed unexpectedly well in terms of volatility once the foreign exchange market stabilized. With respect to interest rates, three-year corporate bond yields during the post-crisis period display remarkably low levels and volatility compared with those of the pre-crisis and crisis periods.
Empirical Results

Granger causality.
In this section, we provide empirical results of the Granger causality test to see how the relation among the three financial variables has changed after the crisis (see Tables III-VIII) . If the government let the exchange rate float freely after the crisis, then we can observe different dynamics among those three variables before and after the crisis. In particular, we concentrate on dynamics between stock prices and exchange rates because of the following reasons. 14 First, bond markets in Korea are not fully developed and credit risks of corporate bonds Note. Each row represents F-statistics for each lag length, from the 1-day to the 10-day horizon. The null hypothesis (A → B) means that A does not Granger cause B. * and ** denote significance at 10 and 5%, respectively. Note. Each row represents F-statistics for each lag length, from the 1-day to the 10-day horizon. The null hypothesis (A → B) means that A does not Granger cause B. * and ** denote significance at 10 and 5%, respectively. Note. Each row represents F-statistics for each lag length, from the 1-day to the 10-day horizon. The null hypothesis (A → B) means that A does not Granger cause B. * and ** denote significance at 10 and 5%, respectively. Note. Each row represents F-statistics for each lag length, from the 1-day to the 10-day horizon. The null hypothesis (A → B) means that A does not Granger cause B. * and ** denote significance at 10 and 5%, respectively. Note. Each row represents F-statistics for each lag length, from the 1-day to the 10-day horizon. The null hypothesis (A → B) means that A does not Granger cause B. * and ** denote significance at 10 and 5%, respectively. Note. Each row represents F-statistics for each lag length, from the 1-day to the 10-day horizon. The null hypothesis (A → B) means that A does not Granger cause B. * and ** denote significance at 10 and 5%, respectively. are still high as corporate and financial sector restructuring has been ongoing after the crisis. Second, foreign capital inflows in Korea-the main cause of short-term fluctuations of the exchange rates-are equity related rather than bonded debt. Even though interest rates do not play an important role in our analysis and our interpretation, we include them to avoid the possibility of a specification error in our modeling.
During the pre-crisis period-the benchmark period to which we compare empirical results of the post-crisis period-interest rates and stock prices had strong feedback relations, which implies that both variables had mutually explanatory power with some lags. Because bond markets remained practically closed to foreign investors during this period, the level of interest rates indicates the extent of the abundance of liquidity in the domestic financial markets. Lower interest rates are expected to make liquidity more abundant and thus cause higher stock prices. On the other hand, higher stock prices, which might be induced by foreign purchase of stocks, imply that foreign capital inflows put downward pressures on the interest rates.
Regarding the causal relations between interest rates and exchange rates, only unidirectional causality is found: interest rates responded to exchange rate movements, but exchange rates movements were not explained by interest rates. Our reflection is that the exchange rate itself was an important policy target during the pre-crisis period. Finally, no causal relationship was found between stock prices and exchange rates during this period. Exchange rates were quite stable, while stock prices fluctuated quite sharply.
During the crisis period, interest rates and stock prices had feedback effects upon each other. Interest rates strongly Granger cause exchange rates, while exchange rates Granger cause interest rates with lags. Exchange rates also strongly Granger cause stock prices, but stock prices do not explain the movements of exchange rates. Interestingly, however, we cannot find any significant Granger causality among the three variables during the post-crisis period.
If the Korean government really allowed the exchange rate to float freely, tighter relations could be observed, at least, between the level of exchange rates and the level of the stock index during the post-crisis period. However, our empirical results show us that this is not the case. It is certainly true that the Granger causality tests in terms of level themselves do not give any direct answer to the existence of government intervention. One might argue that our empirical results would indicate enhancement of market efficiency. Since we are dealing with daily financial variables, it would be natural not to find any causal relations among or between variables if markets were efficient. To abate these concerns, we also explore the Granger causality test in terms of volatility. Our rationale is that there should be spillover effects or causal relations in volatility among financial variables if there was no government intervention because both stock and foreign exchange markets are heavily influenced by foreign capital flows and the new arrival of information from international capital markets. Now, let us examine the Granger causality of the three financial variables in terms of volatility. We define the volatility of a variable y as 1/2|y t+1 − y t |. 15 During the pre-crisis period, the volatility of stock prices Granger causes the volatility of exchange rates. And the volatility of exchange rates also strongly Granger causes the volatility of interest rates. However, other significant causal relations are not found. During the crisis period, the volatility of exchange rates and interest rates respectively Granger cause the volatility of stock prices. The volatility of exchange rates and interest rates respectively has strong feedback effects on each other. During the post-crisis period, however, no Granger causality is found among the volatility of the three variables.
In summary, we find that there exist some causal relations among the three financial variables during the crisis period, but any financial variable does not Granger cause the other one during Period 3 (post-crisis period). The Korean government has taken drastic measures to liberalize financial markets as well as adopting a fully flexible exchange rate system since the currency crisis set in. Thus, it would be a natural conjecture that if the Korean government truly has a hands-off policy in the foreign exchange market, there must be some close interactions among the three financial variables. However, our empirical findings do not support that conjecture during the post-crisis period. This puzzling evidence indirectly provides a clue that the Korean government might heavily intervene in the foreign exchange market against volatile foreign portfolio investment flows. If our reasoning is right, a subsequent question would be why the Korean government has remained preoccupied with a fear of floating as the economy returned to the normalcy. Further reflection will be pursued later in this paper.
Variance decomposition.
We examine how much forecast error variance, in each financial variable, is explained by its own and other lagged variables. Understanding the properties of the forecast errors is exceedingly helpful in uncovering interrelationships among the variables in the system. Tables IX-XI report the forecast error variance decomposition of each variable during the three different periods. Stock price shocks explain most of their own variation during the pre-crisis period. However, exchange rate shocks during the crisis period explain about 23% of the stock price variations at the peak. The peak contribution is found at 3 days after the shocks. Interest rate shocks have also contributed more to the stock price variations during the crisis period at longer lags after the shocks. Shocks in exchange rates and interest rates, during the post-crisis period, explain much less of the variation of the stock prices than those during the crisis period. Shocks in the foreign exchange market explain most of the variation in the exchange rates except for the case of the crisis period. During the crisis period, interest rate shocks explain about 24% of the exchange rate variations at the peak. The peak contribution is found at 10 days after the shocks. With respect to the interest rate variations, its own shocks have a relatively smaller contribution to its variations than the other two variables. During the crisis period, exchange rate shocks explain about 37% at the peak. The peak contribution is found at 10 days after the shocks. During the post-crisis period, the contribution becomes much less, but is still not negligible (about 15% at the peak).
We also apply the variance decomposition techniques to the volatility measures of the three financial variables. The empirical results are reported in Tables XII-XIV. Except for the crisis period, variations in stock price volatility are explained by its own shocks. With respect to variations in exchange rate volatility, shocks in the stock and bond markets have almost negligible contributions over the whole sample period. During the post-crisis period, shocks in the foreign exchange market explain about 11% of the variations of the interest rate volatility.
In summary, during the crisis period, shocks in other related markets make some contribution to explaining the variations of each financial variable-in terms of both level and volatility. Shocks in other markets have relatively larger contributions to the variations of each financial variable during the post-crisis period than during the pre-crisis period. Nevertheless, the size of the contributions is not impressive, implying that the change in exchange rate regime from managed floating to free-floating does not lead to any close relationship among the three variables. This result is a bit surprising because the Korean government has taken a fullblown financial market liberalization since the crisis and, therefore, there should exist co-movement between either volatility or levels of stock prices and exchange rates.
High Frequency Data Analysis
From the above empirical analysis, we find that causal relations among the three financial variables are still weak during the post-crisis period, and furthermore, shocks in other financial markets do not make a significant contribution to explaining the variations of each financial variable's forecast errors. Now, we will more closely examine the exchange rate behaviors during the post-crisis period by using high frequency data, to be able to discern whether the government has intervened in the foreign exchange market. Our hypothesis is that if the government has intervened in the foreign exchange market and the government has effectively offset any significant shock to the exchange rate, the intraday exchange rate data will not show any volatility clustering phenomenon, which is quite commonly found in most advanced foreign exchange markets. 16 We use the intraday exchange rate data, the interval of which is two minutes. The sample period covers September 10-20, 1999. Thus, the number of observations in the sample is 1188. During this sample period, the won-dollar exchange rates fluctuated within 20 won, and the rate of change is within ±5 won. These surprisingly stable exchange rate movements are based on the fact that any larger change in the won-dollar exchange rates disappears immediately (merely within a few minutes) as shown in Fig. 5 . Thus, exchange rate data in Korea's foreign exchange market does not exhibit volatility clustering, which is a typical phenomenon of the free-floating exchange rate regime. In this regard, we are more inclined to say that the Korean government has intervened in the foreign exchange market so as to stabilize the exchange rate fluctuations.
CONCLUSION: POLICY CHALLENGES
The Korean government responded to the currency crisis by adopting a free floating exchange rate regime and by more actively pursuing capital account liberalization. As a natural consequence, we may expect that the foreign exchange market is more likely to be linked to other financial markets, such as stock and bond markets. However, the foreign exchange market has been relatively stable during the post-crisis period, while the stock market has been extremely volatile. Since the bond market in Korea is not fully developed and credit risks of corporate bonds are still high, foreigners are rather reluctant to participate in the domestic bond market. One important indication, to support our presumption that the Korean government has intervened in the foreign exchange market, is the stability of exchange rates relative to stock prices.
Under the free-floating exchange rate regime with free mobility of capital flows. We will focus on two reasons why the Korean government intervened in the foreign exchange market. One is related to the vulnerability of financial markets in Korea. In order to build a buffer to this vulnerability, the Korean government continued to accumulate foreign reserves even during the post-crisis period. While financial and corporate restructuring were still underway, events of Daewoo's bankruptcy and resultant ITC troubles increased the vulnerability in Korea's financial markets. To counter the financial vulnerabilities, the Korean government undertook various measures. Also recognizing the fact that the currency turmoil resulted in financial panic in Korea, the Korean government endeavored to strengthen ex ante defensive measures.
A certain level of foreign reserves can be geared into a set of self-defensive measures. However, the recommended level of foreign reserves, which is equivalent to the value of three months of imports, will not be adequate in times of free capital mobility. Taking short-term capital movements and possible reversals into account, it can be suggested that a minimum level of foreign reserves, which can finance short-term external liabilities plus capital outflows, should be maintained. Short-term external liabilities include (1) short-term external liabilities of domestic financial institutions and companies, (2) long-term external liabilities having maturity within one year, and (3) local financing through foreign financial institutions by subsidiaries of domestic companies. On the other hand, capital outflows are composed of foreign portfolio investment outflows and residents' capital flight. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that capital flights are negligible (not necessarily true, even in the case of Korea). Table XV exhibits a benchmark minimum level of foreign reserves as of the end of October 1999.
Short-term external liabilities amount to approximately US$ 36 billion, while long-term external liabilities having maturity within one-year sum to about US$ 13 billion. Short-term local financing also amounts to approximately US$ 16 billion. Now, one delicate technicality concerns the estimated level of capital outflows from the stock of foreign portfolio investment. As of the end of September 1999, the market value of foreign portfolio investment stock amounted to US$ 46.2 billion. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that approximately 20% of the total will leave the domestic financial markets when the crisis sets in. Thus, our estimated amount of capital outflows will be approximately US$ 9 billion. Summing up these four components, we have US$ 74 billion as a benchmark minimum level of foreign reserves. It is undoubtedly a controversial issue whether this minimum level of foreign reserves can be considered as a useful benchmark for the government's reserve policies. If Korea can meet external financing requirements without any serious difficulty at the time of a foreign liquidity shortage as most industrial countries do, a currency crisis can be resolved more easily through immediate adjustments of exchange rates. However, if we suppose that short-term external borrowings are not rolled over, since domestic financial institutions lose the confidence of foreign creditors, a currency crisis will then develop into a full-blown financial crisis. Adjustments of exchange rates through sharp depreciation will relieve the pressure of capital outflows. However, financial market vulnerability will not vanish within a short period of time.
The Korean government is keenly aware of the important lesson from the recent crisis that, in the age of global financial integration, the financial sector is increasingly as important as the real sector. Based upon this recognition, the Korean government will pursue financial sector restructuring on a continuous basis. However, it will take several years to develop healthy financial institutions and markets such as those in industrial countries. A more flexible exchange rate system will definitely reduce the required level of foreign reserves, only if Korea has much sounder financial systems.
Korea's foreign reserves have already exceeded our estimated minimum level. Continued foreign portfolio investment inflows have been absorbed into the foreign reserves. However, one concern should be noted. If the government intentionally makes the currency cheap through foreign exchange intervention in the name of foreign reserve accumulation, this undervaluation of the currency will not be sustainable because anticipated appreciation will continuously bring about more foreign capital inflows. Many exporting companies in Korea still demand that the government not only maintains exchange rate stability, but also keeps the won-dollar exchange rate undervalued, even though the free-floating exchange rate regime has been introduced. Export competitiveness and resultant current account surplus might be policy targets, but in most cases, might incur both external and internal imbalances. In this regard, the role of price mechanism under this free-floating exchange rate regime should not be discredited.
The other important justification for the government's intervention in the foreign exchange market can be found in the vulnerable and underdeveloped infrastructure of the foreign exchange market. As the free-floating exchange rate regime was introduced, the Korean government also endeavored to develop the infrastructure of the foreign exchange market through various means. First of all, policymakers point out the problem that market participants are limited in Korea's foreign exchange market. In order to broaden the foreign exchange market, the government has lifted various regulations on speculative trading. If the foreign exchange market operates freely from any intervention, volatility will increase and the necessity of hedging and speculative demand will increase. Volatility may be a necessary evil to induce more market participants. In this regard, it might be argued that the government should allow for some degree of volatility as a natural outcome of the free-floating exchange rate regime, since foreign exchange market intervention seems truly inconsistent with the government's plan for foreign exchange market development. Nevertheless, there are many other obstacles in developing a more liquid foreign exchange market. That is to say, the government's nonintervention exchange rate policies will not sufficiently increase the volume of daily turnovers in Korea's foreign exchange market.
The basic transaction fees in the interbank market are surprisingly cheap: only 4000 won per US$ one million for spot, forward, and swap (beyond one month). 17 The major factor restraining the market access of domestic banks into the interbank market is the inadequate provision of credit lines. While foreign banks' branches play a role as market makers, domestic banks as foreign exchange traders do not receive enough credit from those foreign banks' branches because the credit ratings of most domestic banks are still below noninvestment grade. This limited access of domestic banks to interbank forward or swap transactions has even aggravated foreign exchange trading in the customers markets. Since domestic banks have to square the foreign exchange positions through, such as swaps, they have been reluctant to provide forward contracts to domestic companies. Most companies should provide some form of guarantee such as deposits or securities. This extremely limited accessibility to the currency hedging markets has obligated the government to intervene in the foreign exchange market to stabilize exchange rate fluctuations. As shown in Table XVII , the volume of transactions in the third quarter of 1999 has increased almost twice as much as that in the same quarter of 1998. This partly reflects the improvements in the creditworthiness of domestic companies.
